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Locating a Public Good on a Sphere
Swarnendu Chatterjee  Hans Petersy Ton Storcken z
September 18, 2015
Abstract
There have been many studies on the location of public goods where
the agents are equipped with single-peaked preferences. Generally speak-
ing, single-peakedness of preferences seems to allow for more possibilities
and to lead less frequently to dictatorship (Black (1948), Moulin (1980),
Kim and Roush (1981), Border and Jordan (1983), Peters et al. (1992)).
This paper deals with the problem of nding a location for a public facil-
ity on a sphere. We assume that a nite number of agents equipped with
single peaked preferences, reaches a decision by voting. We show that the
coordinate-wise median rule is not strategy-proof in this domain, which
is in contrast with many ndings in the literature. Then we prove that
any strict strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. We also
prove that any coalitional strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dicta-
torial. To prove the dictatorship results we use the ultralter technique.
Hence we show that the set of decisive coalitions is intersection closed.
The problem with only strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality is still
open.
We start with describing the model together with necessary notes on spher-
ical geometry. In the next section we present implications of strategy-proofness
and Pareto optimality in our model. In the following section we prove our
main results one assuming coalitional strategy-proof and another assuming strict
strategy-proof.
1 Introduction and model
In our collective decision problem, the set of alternatives is the unit sphere
A = fx 2 R3 : jxj = 1g , where j:j denotes Euclidean distance. We rst collect
some useful facts about spherical geometry.
1.1 Some facts about spherical geometry
 The distance between two points x and y on the sphere is measured along
a great circle, i.e. a circle with radius 1 and as center the origin. A great-
circles is the intersection of a plane through the origin and A. Since this
distance is a monotonic transformation of Euclidean distance, we simply
denote it as jx  yj :
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 Observe that for every x 2 A there is a unique point in A that has maximal
distance to x (diametrically opposite); we denote this point by x^, called
the antipodal point of the point x.
 We denote the great circle through any two points x 2 A and y 2 A by
Gxy: If x and y are antipodal, then Gxy = A:
 For a; b 2 A (a 6= b^) we denote the closed (shortest) arc by [a _ b], clearly
[a _ b]  Gab: Also, [a _ b[= [a _ b] n fbg; ]a _ b] = [a _ b] n fag; ]a _
b[= [a _ b] n fa; bg: For a = b^ 2 A, there are innitely many great-circles
through them. Therefore, for a = b^ 2 A, we dene [a _ b] = A. In this
case, [a _ b[= A n fbg; ]a _ b] = A n fag; ]a _ b[= A n fa; bg:
 For a great-circle G and a point t 2 A n G, (G; t) denotes the (open)
hemisphere of all points of A on the same side of G as t, excluding G:
The closed hemisphere is denoted by (G; t); hence (G; t) = (G; t) [G:
 The perpendicular bisector of a closed arc [a _ b] is the great-circle that
passes through the midpoint of [a _ b] and is perpendicular to [a _ b]
( or Gab):
 A set C  A is convex if it contains all the arcs [x _ y] joining any two
points x; y 2 C.
 The convex hull of a set X is the set Co(X) = \fC : X  C;C convex g:
1.2 The social choice model
Now we formulate our social choice model. The set of agents is N = f1; : : : ; ng
with n  2. Each agent i 2 N has a single-peaked preference on A, charac-
terized by a peak p(i): So, for agent i, a point x 2 A is weakly preferred to
another point y 2 A if and only if x  p(i)  y   p(i) :
A prole is a vector p 2 AN , where p = (p(1); p(2); : : : ; p(n)): A social
choice rule or rule  assigns to each p 2 AN a collective decision (p) 2 A:
Let S  N . Proles p and q are S-deviations if p(i) = q(i) for all i 2 N n S:
A point t 2 A is Pareto optimal for a prole p 2 AN , there does not exist a
point t0 2 A n ftg such that t0   p(i)  t  p(i) for all i 2 N , with at least
one strict inequality. Next we dene some desirable properties of :
  is manipulable by S if there are S-deviations p; q 2 AN , such that(p)  p(i)  (q)  q(i) for all i 2 S; where at least one of these
inequalities is strict.
  is coalitional strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any T  N:
  is intermediate strategy-proof if it is not manipulable from any
T -unanimous prole p, i.e. p(i) = p(j) for all i; j 2 T , to T -deviation q:
  is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by singleton coalitions T:
  is strict strategy-proof if for all i 2 N and fig-deviations p and q,
either (p) = (q) or
(p)  p(i) < (q)  p(i) :
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  is intermediate strict strategy-proof if for all T and T-deviations q
from a T -unanimous prole p, we have either (p) = (q) or
(p)  p(i) <(q)  p(i) for all i 2 T:
  is Pareto optimal if for every p 2 AN , (p) is a Pareto optimal point
for p:
Remark 1 Observe that antipodal points of the peaks can be considered as
dips, where the dip d(i) of agent i 2 N is such that x 2 A is weakly preferred
to y 2 A if and only if x  d(i)  y   d(i) . Thus, single peaked preferences
can also be viewed as single-dipped preferences.
A coalition S  N is decisive if for every t 2 A and every prole p 2 AN
with p(i) = t for all i 2 S we have (p) = t. If one particular agent d becomes
decisive then she is called the dictator. A rule is dictatorial if there is an agent
d such that (p) = p(d) for every p 2 AN :
We begin our study with rules satisfying strategy-proofness and Pareto op-
timality.
2 Strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality
In this section, rule  is assumed to be strategy-proof and Pareto optimal.
Remark 2 Let p(i) 2 H for all i 2 N , where H is a hemisphere. A point t is
Pareto optimal for p if and only if t 2 Co(P ), where P = fp(1); p(2); : : : ; p(n)g:
Lemma 1 Let S  N . Then S is decisive or N n S is decisive.
Next we provide an example of a coordinatewise median rule which is
Pareto optimal but not strategy-proof.
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Figure 1
To dene a spherical coordinate system, one must choose two orthogonal
directions, the polar and the azimuth reference, and an origin point in space.
These choices determine a reference plane that contains the origin and is per-
pendicular to the polar. The spherical coordinates (; ) of a point P (see
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Figure 1a) are then dened as follows: Euclidean coordinate of point P is
(sin cos; sin sin; cos): A coordinatewise median rule Fcoord takes coor-
dinates of all the peaks (1; 1); (2; 2); : : : ; (n; n) and then computes medi-
ans of both the polar angles median(1; 2; : : : ; n) = med and azimuth angles
median(1; 2; : : : ; n) = med. So,
Fcoord(p(1); p(2); : : : ; p(n)) = Fcoord((1; 1); (2; 2); : : : ; (n; n)) = (med; med):
Example 1 Suppose there are three agents 1,2, and 3 with peaks at (0; 0); (0; 90),
(90; 45) respectively. Corresponding Euclidean coordinates are (0; 0; 1); (1; 0; 0);
(0; 1p
2
; 1p
2
): Coordinate-wise median rule provides the outcome  = (0; 45)(Spherical-
coordinate) or  = ( 1p
2
; 0; 1p
2
)(Euclidean-coordinate). Now if agent 3 deviates
and reports (90; 0): Then 0 = (0; 0)(Spherical coordinate) or 0 = (0; 0; 1):
Note that, j  (0; 1p
2
; 1p
2
)j2 = 1 and j0   (0; 1p
2
; 1p
2
)j2 = 2 p2: So, agent 3
with peak at (90; 45) can manipulate by reporting (90; 0): Hence the rule
is not strategy-proof.
In what follows, we show that both under strict strategy-proofness and under
coalitional strategy-proofness, the set of decisive coalitions is an ultralter D on
N; i.e.
1. N 2 D:
2. for each S  N either S 2 D or N n S 2 D:
3. for all S; T 2 D, then S \ T 2 D:
It is well-known and easy to see that an ultralter D contains a unique
singleton fdg, so that d is a dictator.
Remark 3 Suppose V andW are decisive coalitions and V \W is not decisive.
Then, by Lemma 1, N n (V \W ) is decisive. Let X = V nW;Y = V \W , and
Z = N nV . So X [Y = V; Y [Z = N n (V nW ) W and X [Z = N n (V \W )
are decisive. We use this fact in the following proofs.
3 Strict strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-
proofness
Lemma 2 Let  be Pareto optimal and strict strategy-proof. If V and W are
decisive coalitions, then V \W is decisive.
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Figure 2: Proof of rst half of Lemma 2
Proof. To the contrary assume that V \W is not decisive. X, Y , and Z are
dened as Remark 3. Consider a prole p such that, p(i) = a for all i 2 X,
p(j) = b for all j 2 Y , p(i) = c for all k 2 Z. We denote p as p = (aX ; bY ; cZ).
a; b and c are chosen to be equidistant on a great-circle. Next we show that
(p) is not on Gab:
Since X [ Y is decisive, hence (bX[Y ; cZ) = b and (aX[Y ; cZ) = a, it
follows by strict strategy-proofness thata  (p) < ja  bj or (p) = b
and
b  (p) < jb  aj or (p) = a: (1)
Similarly since X [Z is decisive, hence (aX[Z ; bY ) = a and (cX[Z ; bY ) =
c, it follows by strict strategy-proofness thatc  (p) < jc  aj or (p) = a
and
a  (p) < ja  cj or (p) = c: (2)
Since Y [Z is decisive,hence (aX ; bY [Z) = b and (aX ; cY [Z) = c, it follows
by strict strategy-proofness thatc  (p) < jc  bj or (p) = b
and
b  (p) < jb  cj or (p) = c: (3)
Suppose (p) = a, then equation (3) is not satised. Hence (p) 6= a; and
similarly (p) 6= b and (p) 6= c. To satisfy (1)-(3) (p) must belong to the
(open) shaded region in Figure 2 and the reection of that region on the other
side of the sphere with respect to the great-circle Gab: Hence (p) =2 Gab:
Let G1 and G2 be the two hemispheres separated by Gab: Assume without
loss of generality that (p) 2 G1. Consider a point d 2 G2. Let us denote
(xX ; bY ; cZ) by px: By Remark 2, (pd) 2 G2. Consider a sequence of points
fdkg1k=1 2 G2 converging to a. As G2 is compact we may assume that for some
subsequence of fdkg1k=1 the images fk = (pdk) are converging to a point, say
f, in G2: Without loss of generality we may assume that the original sequence
does so. Now, f 6= a, otherwise fk   a < (p)  a for large k, so X could
manipulate by (dk
X ; bY ; cZ) at p.
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Figure 3: Proof of second half of Lemma 2
Let L be the perpendicular bisector of [(p) _ f]: If a 2 (L; fk), i.e.
if L separates a and (p), then for large k we have
a  (p) > a  fk
(see Figure 3). So X can manipulate at p to (dk
X ; bY ; cZ) which contradicts
intermediate strategy-proofness. If a 2 (L; (p)) (see Figure 3), then for large
k we have some  > 0 such that
dk   (p) +  < jdk   fj and fk   f < .
So,
fk   f + dk   fk > jdk   fj and therewith dk   fk +  > jdk   fj :
Hence,
dk   (p) +  < jdk   fj < dk   fk +  and therewith dk   (p) <dk   fk : So, X can manipulate at (dkX ; bY ; cZ) to p which also contradicts
intermediate strategy-proofness. Hence a must be on the great-circle L:
Consider a point e on [f _ a]: Consider (eX ; bY ; cZ): Now (eX ; bY ; cZ)
cannot be equal to f as this would violate intermediate strict strategy-proofness,
because
a  (p) = ja  fj where (p) 6= f: Now we can nd points ek
on [fk _ dk] such that fekg1k=1 converges to e: As, by strategy-proofness,
(ek
X ; bY ; cZ) = (dk
X ; bY ; cZ) = fk it follows like before that e is on the
perpendicular bisector of [f _ (eX ; bY ; cZ)]: Hence,
e  (eX ; bY ; cZ) =
je  fj : But then a  (p) = ja  fj = jf   ej+ja  ej = (eX ; bY ; cZ)  e+
ja  ej > (eX ; bY ; cZ)  a contradicting intermediate strict strategy-proofness.
This contradiction ends the proof.
Corollary 1 By Lemmas 1 and 2 the collection D of decisive coalitions is an
ultralter if  satises strict strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality.
Lemma 3 Let  be Pareto optimal and coalitional strategy-proof. If V and W
are decisive coalitions, then V \W is decisive.
a b
c
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Figure 4: Co(fa; b; cg)
6
Proof. To the contrary suppose that V \ W is not decisive. X, Y , and Z
are dened as Remark 3. Consider a prole p = (aX ; bY ; cZ) with a; b; c 2 A
(hence agents in X have their peaks at a, agents in Y at b, and agents in Z
at c). Points a; b; and c are such that the convex hull Co(fa; b; cg) formed by
them has all the inner angles less than 90: Since angle between [a _ b] and
[b _ c] is less than 90 and also the angle between [a _ c] and [b _ c] is less
than 90, the points a; b; c must belong to one hemisphere. So, by Remark 2,
(aX ; bY ; cZ) 2 Co(fa; b; cg):
Suppose the outcome (p) =2 [a _ b]: Then we join (p) with its nearest
point m on [a _ b]: Now ja mj < a  (p) and jb mj < b  (p) : Hence
X and Y can jointly manipulate by deviating to m, which is a violation of
coalitional strategy-proofness. Thus, (p) 2 [a _ b]: Similarly we can show
that (p) 2 [c _ a] and (p) 2 [b _ c]: But this is not possible. Hence we can
conclude that V \W must be decisive.
Corollary 2 By Lemmas 1 and 3 the collection D of decisive coalitions is an
ultralter if  satises coalitional strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality.
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